



[Redacted]

BILAG

CHRISTIAN HARLANG

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Outgoing Number: 0.098.390-0497

Date: 2004-11-29

(Please quote by correspondence)

To  
COS 4 ARMD BDE

I-NET

Subject  
POST OPERATION REPORT - OP GREEN DESERT

Enclosure:  
POST OPERATION REPORT - OP GREEN DESERT

FOR THE COMMANDER

[Redacted signature]

Lcpl  
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[Redacted]



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To  
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Subject  
POST OPERATION REPORT - OP GREEN DESERT

Reference : a. Bde FRAGO 4X/058 - OP GREEN DESERT  
b. DANBN FRAGO 284 - OP GREEN DESERT

Enclosure :

**1. GENERAL**

OP GREEN DESERT was executed between 250330CNOV and 251305CNOV. The operation was originally planned as a search and arrest operation with ISF lead. This was the first large scale joint ISF/MNF operation to be planned and executed by DANBN. Initial planning with [redacted] ING Bn established that DANBN would conduct the search and arrest operation with ING support (targets 1, 2 and 4 would be done solely by DANBN). This changed during the planning process.

**2. PLANNING AND PREPARATIONS**

**2.1. Intelligence.**

The operation was based solely upon information gathered by [redacted] ING Bn during the months of OCT and NOV. As such the information was difficult to evaluate and was assessed to be from a single source F8. [redacted]

**2.2. Coordination.**

During the planning process DANBN HQ held three coordination/planning meetings. [redacted] information provided by the ING was examined and [redacted] information previously [redacted]. It became clear that further examination of the information was needed before detailed planning could commence. Other issues, such as the status of tgt CYAN 4 (a religious headquarter), possible public reactions due to the proximity of the mosque to tgt CYAN 1 and possible public reactions to such an operation being undertaken in Az Zubayr (AZ) were all discussed. At the second planning meeting a common understanding of intent was established; [redacted] information provided by the ING [redacted] [redacted] This led to an understanding that the ING would conduct the operation whilst DANBN would provide [redacted]

forces for the outer cordon. The later would enable the ING to conduct the search and arrest op in a "protected environment". DANBN also agreed to provide MP mentoring assistance during the ING search and arrest phase. The ISF would remain responsible for arresting, searching and securing evidence. The TSU was chosen to be present at all targets in order to help the ING conduct arrests and secure evidence. DANBN set a precondition that the ING would provide the legal foundation and warrants for the op. ING Bn agreed to this. An agreement that ING/TSU troops should be available for rehearsal at SLB was also made. Furthermore it was agreed that a Joint Forward Command Post (FCP) should be established in order to coordinate and control the operation.

### 3. FORMAL ORDERS

At 232140CNOV copies of the preliminary formal orders were issued to DANBN subunit commanders in order to allow the subunits to prepare for the following formal orders at 241000CNOV. Representatives from [redacted] ING Bn [redacted] ING Bn and TSU BASRAH were present at DANBN Hq for the formal orders. These orders were given in English and Arabic with coordination between sub unit commanders following the conclusion of the orders.

### 3. FINAL PREPARATIONS.

#### 3.1. Rehearsal.

Subunit rehearsals were scheduled to occur on completion of orders. This proved to be a complicated matter as the ING and TSU were unable to provide their troops at the required time. This might well have been a result of the way in which the ING work in shifts [redacted]

[redacted] As a consequence no rehearsal or mentoring with troops was possible prior to the operation.

#### 3.2. War Gaming.

War gaming was conducted by Bn and Coy commanders. Sub unit commanders had some opportunity to coordinate the main parts of the plan with their counterparts, however the lack of ING platoon and section commanders prevented detailed coordination and fine adjustment of sub units plans to occur.

#### 3.3. Final preparations.

By 241800C all preparations had been concluded and a clear and common understanding of the operation between the sub units formalized. This is worth mentioning as subsequent Bde Instructions, including the Bde FRAGO (Reference a.), did not take the complicated chain of command and the problems of establishing common ground fully into consideration. Due to last minute changes DANBN was forced to become involved in the search and arrest phase itself. This hampered the division of responsibility which had been previously agreed and caused ISF commanders on the ground to question the orders they had been given. It also led to ING and TSU questioning DANBN motives for getting more involved [redacted]

### 4. EXECUTION

#### 4.1. Forming up.

Units formed up at 250500CNOV in AAs which had been chosen by IFS so that they could be located in the dark. The movement to targets went according to plan but MNF had to guide the ISF to the tgts. The TSU were delayed by five minutes however they had

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reported this beforehand [REDACTED]

#### 4.2. Cordon.

DANBN established outer cordons around tgts 1, 3 and 4, whilst ING/TSU units moved in to establish the inner cordon according to plan. This went very smoothly. In general the attitude of the ING was very good. They had sound tactical movements and procedures [REDACTED]

#### 4.3. Search and Arrest.

The search and arrest was conducted by the TSU at tgts 3 and 4 and by ING at tgt 1. There was a clear difference in the way ING and TSU operated to solve the task. In general the ING started out well, had good tactics and seemed well motivated. [REDACTED]

The TSU conducted satisfactory searches at tgts 3 and 4. They were swift, disciplined and remained focused throughout the entire operation, which resulted in only minor mentoring. They had a sound knowledge of procedures which they were able to apply [REDACTED]

38 Pak were detained, a number of weapons, items of intelligence value such as address books, pictures, mobile phones and a personal computer were recovered by the ING/TSU. This evidence should have been collected by the TSU and brought back to TSU headquarters however last minute confusion led to the ING bringing their evidence back to Camp Chindit. This then had to be recovered after the operation and brought back to TSU headquarters.

As no joint FCP had been established it proved impossible to counter these problems during the operation [REDACTED]

#### 4.4. Redeployment.

At 250800C the decision was made to search tgt CYAN 2. Units deployed and cordon was in place by 251042C, at 251109C the search was initiated. The TSU units searching the target found 150 Kg of Hashish and apprehended two persons. At 251230CNOV the operation was terminated and units returned to bases.

### 5. LESSONS IDENTIFIED

#### 5.1. Planning

It is of great importance to include the ISF in the early planning phases. This provides ownership of the plan and develops mutual understanding of intent and scheme of manoeuvre.

A paper should be prepared outlining the agreements made during the planning meeting and this should be seen as a form of a contract. This should include preconditions and division of responsibilities.